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Non-Practicing Entities & Patent Reform
By Nicholas Douglas
Abstract
The patent system is designed to promote innovation and
supply a blueprint for innovative minds to improve upon, but the
behavior of some patent owners is contrary to these principles.
Non-practicing entities obtain patent rights, and rather than
produce the product claimed in the patent, they assert their
exclusionary rights broadly and aggressively against businesses
producing similar products in order to induce settlement or
licensing payments. These assertions account for a significant
percentage of infringement claims and threaten a potentially
innocent business with expensive litigation. The actions of these
entities have a substantial effect on the patent system and have
been the motivation behind reform and recent Supreme Court
decisions. Each of the three branches of government has
significant influence over the patent system, and each has the
potential to promote change to reduce the impact of nonpracticing entities on the United States patent system and on the
United States economy.
I. Introduction to The Patent System and Non-Practicing
Entities
It could not be argued otherwise that the purpose of the
patent is to promote the progress of science and useful arts, for
the words come from our highest legal authority, The United
States Constitution.1 To an inventor, a patent means security.
Patents provide a safeguard for inventors, protecting their right
to their own product and incentivizing continued innovation.
Absent the safety of a patent, an inventor without capital has
nothing more than an idea ready to be seized by a capable
company. Who would continue in the advancement of science
and technology if their life’s work could be swept away by anyone
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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with their ear to the door? Patents work to remove inventions
from the shadows of laboratories and promote disclosure so that
one’s ideas may be built upon by another’s ideas. The spirit of
the patent is embodied in the quote by Isaac Newton in a letter
addressed to Robert Hooke: “If I have seen further, it is by
standing on the shoulders of giants.”2
An issued patent in compliance with statutory requirements
provides the owner, and his heirs or assigns, with “the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale . . . or
importing” the patented subject matter.3 A patent owner may
bring an action in district court against a party whose product is
claimed to infringe against the rights of the owner. While a
patent approved by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (“USPTO”) is presumed to be valid, in court, a defendant
in an infringement suit may defend or counter with a claim of
invalidity.4 A patent may be held invalid if the subject matter is
found unpatentable, if the invention is obvious, or if the
invention lacks novelty under the statute.5 Since infringement
suits require extensive time and money, the USPTO provides
several proceedings that may be initiated following the grant of
a patent that are designed to settle such disputes. These postgrant proceedings were expanded in the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”).6
The AIA brought substantial reform to United States patent
law.7 Some of the most significant changes were to the
procedure for contesting the validity of a third party’s patent.
Prior to the implementation of the AIA, a third party could
assert invalidity in three ways: as a defense to an infringement
suit; petition for inter partes reexamination; or file for ex parte

2. Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675) (on file with
author), https://digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php/Detail/objects/9792.
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a) (2012).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). A patent may be held invalid if it is found that
the subject matter is unpatentable, if the invention is obvious or lacks novelty,
or if the invention fails to demonstrate utility under the statute. See infra note
5.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 101-03 (2012).
6. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No.
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
7. Id.
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reexamination with the USPTO.8 Ex parte reexamination
proceedings involve only the patent owner and the USPTO,
giving the petitioning party limited opportunity to assert his or
her case.9 Inter partes reexamination was instituted in the
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 and allowed for third
party participation, but was overhauled by the AIA in 201110
The AIA created new alternatives for a party to contest the
validity of another party’s patent. These alternatives are known
as inter partes review (“IPR”) and post-grant review.11
IPR is an adversarial proceeding within the USPTO, which
is brought by a third party who contests the validity of another
party’s patent.12 IPR takes place before a panel of three
Administrative Patent Judges of the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (“PTAB”).13 The petition is limited to contesting the
patent under the statutory novelty or obviousness standards.14
The petitioning party must identify existing patents or printed
publications that raise a question of the patent’s validity.15
8. Jason Scott Tiedeman & Eric D. Gorman, Declaratory Judgement
Actions, Covenants Not to Sue, and Bad Patents: A Call to Allow the Judiciary
to Weed Out Bad Patents while Adhering to the “Case or Controversy”
Requirement, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 22-26, 41 (2012).
9. Id. at 29.
10. Id. at 26-27. One of the most significant changes brought by the AIA
was the changing of the standard used to grant a review of a patent. The AIA
lowered the review from “a substantial new question of patentability” to “‘a
reasonable likelihood that’ the challenger ‘would prevail.’” Cuozzo Speed
Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016); compare 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)
(2006) (repealed), with 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
11. Tiedeman & Gorman, supra note 8, at 27. Post-grant review is an
adversarial proceeding that became available after March 2013 with the
implementation of the AIA. Post-grant review differs from IPR in the legal
standard required for a showing of invalidity, in order for the USPTO to grant
review. Post-grant review has the higher legal standard, as a petitioner must
show that “it is more likely than not” that the proceeding will result in the
cancellation of one or more of the patent claims. IPR requires the petitioner to
show that there is a reasonable likelihood of success that one or more of the
claims are anticipated by the prior art. Post-grant review, therefore, requires
a showing of a 51% or greater chance of success while IPR encompasses 50%
or greater. Id. at 40, 74.
12. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 311-19 (2012).
13. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-01356-EJD,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4095, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)(A) (2012). This is yet another way in which postgrant review differs from inter partes review; patents being reviewed post-
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Additionally, the petition must be brought at the conclusion of
post-grant review within nine months of the grant of the patent
or within one year of the commencement of an infringement
suit.16
The purpose of IPR was to “establish a more efficient and
streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and
limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”17 It
seeks to accomplish this goal by expeditiously resolving issues
within one year of the granting of IPR, and providing estoppel
on the issue of invalidity of patent claims during litigation in
federal court.18 Additionally, the process works to remove bad
patents and promote valid patents through contests by third
parties.19 Because of this, courts will often stay proceedings
pending the outcome of IPR.20 Recent statistics in 2013 show
that courts stay proceedings across the country at a rate of
approximately sixty percent when an IPR decision is pending.21
Some of the benefits of staying the proceeding include the
examination of the patent by experienced patent judges, the
potential reduction in arguable factors at trial, judicial
efficiency, and possible dismissal if the patent is held invalid by
the PTAB judges.22 Avoiding costly litigation and having the
benefit of experienced patent judges are not the only benefits of
choosing IPR; there are several fundamental differences
between IPR and district court procedures that influence the
outcome for parties wishing to contest the validity of another’s
grant may be argued invalid on much broader grounds. Compare 35 U.S.C.
§ 321 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)(A) (2012).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1)-(2) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012).
17. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant
Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method
Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48680-01 (Aug. 14, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100
(2017)).
18. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-01356-EJD,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4095, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014).
19. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (citing
157 Cᴏɴɢ. Rᴇᴄ. 9778 (2011) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte)).
20. See id. at 2146.
21. Robert Arcamona & David Cavanaugh, Stays to Litigation Pending
IPR and CBM Review: Statistics, Trends, and Key Issues, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
Mar. 2014, at 9, https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/
Editorial/Publications/Documents/IP-today-stays-to-litigation-pending.pdf.
22. Mathew R. Frontz, Staying Litigation Pending Inter Partes Review
and the Effects on Patent Litigation, 24 Fᴇᴅ. CIR. B.J. 469, 472-73 (2015).
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patent.
The procedure of IPR and district court proceedings differ
substantially. In IPR, the parties have the option, although
rarely granted, of amending or modifying their claims.23
Conversely, in district court, there is no such option.24
Additionally, case schedules between the two approaches can
differ drastically; district court procedures and patent trials may
take several years, while IPR is statutorily mandated to be
completed within one year of commencement.25 The procedures
also differ in the absence of summary judgment in IPR, absence
of a jury at a PTAB hearing, limitation of issues to patentability
in IPR,26 restrictions on witness testimony in IPR, and
settlement practices.27 Furthermore, discovery procedures vary
drastically; in district court, discovery is broadly available, while
in IPR, discovery is limited to routine discovery and a significant
showing of relevancy and appropriateness of the discovery
requests must be presented to the Board for additional
discovery.28 Lastly, judgments from each may be appealed to the
Federal Circuit, although the standards of review on appeal
differ depending on which legal avenue was utilized.29 District
court decisions are reviewed for clear error while PTAB decisions
are reviewed for substantial evidence.30 These differences in
procedure influence a party’s decision to pursue a claim in
district court and/or to pursue a determination of validity via
IPR.
23. Michael J. Flibbert & Maureen D. Queler, 5 Distinctions Between
IPRs and District Court Patent Litigation, Fɪɴɴᴇɢᴀɴ (Dec. 16, 2015),
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=64c22ef
3-9abe-4637-a445-c75c56892eb1.
24. Id.
25. 37 C.F.R § 42.100(c) (2017).
26. Flibbert & Queler, supra note 23. A district court may hear a variety
of issues including infringement, damages, misuse, etc., but IPR is limited to
the patentability of the claims under novelty and obviousness standards. 37
C.F.R. § 42.104(2) (2017) (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (2012)).
27. Flibbert & Queler, supra note 23.
28. Id.; compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), with 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b) (2017).
29. Flibbert & Queler, supra note 23.
30. Id.; Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ.’s Embrace of PTAB to Fuel More AIA
Reviews, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2016, 1:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
767549/fed-circ-s-embrace-of-ptab-to-fuel-more-aia-reviews (board decision
affirmance rates are quite high as a result of a more deferential standard of
review for PTAB decisions).
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There are several fundamental differences between IPR and
district court review that also have had an influence on the rate
of patents being held invalid in IPR proceedings. One difference
is that, in IPR, the legal standard of review is the preponderance
of the evidence test, while district courts use the clear and
convincing test.31 Clear and convincing evidence is “the highest
burden of proof in U.S. civil litigation” and provides a
presumption of validity of patents being contested in court.32 In
proceedings involving PTAB judges, no presumption of validity
exists, and the patent may be invalidated under a finding of
invalidity by preponderance of the evidence.33 This fundamental
difference is discussed later as a potential area for patent
Another difference is the standard for claim
reform.34
construction. The PTAB judges utilize the “broadest reasonable
construction standard” while the federal courts must view the
claim’s explicit language and its meaning to a person having
“ordinary skill in the art.”35
The two analytical procedures that are employed by the
separate entities may result in a different claim meaning,
depending on who is reviewing the patent. There are several
instances where both the district court and PTAB have
participated in claim construction for the same claims, but it is
fairly rare under the AIA amendments, due to courts frequently
staying proceedings during IPR review.36 In cases where both
entities have reviewed the patent, there are several instances in
which the PTAB judges have reached the same claim
construction as the district court,37 and several cases in which
31. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Dep’t of Com., MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 706 (9th ed. 2018). “In other words, an examiner
should reject a claim if, in view of the prior art and evidence of record, it is
more likely than not that the claim is unpatentable” Id.; See also Cuozzo Speed
Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
32. Flibbert & Queler, supra note 23.
33. Id.
34. See infra Section III.
35. Jacob Oyloe et al., Claim Constructions in PTAB vs. District Court,
LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2014, 10:50 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/581715/
claim-constructions-in-ptab-vs-district-court. See also Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2134 (2016) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
36. Oyloe et al., supra note 35.
37. Id.; see, e.g., Google Inc. v. SimpleAir, Inc., No. CBM2014-00054, 2014
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they have differed,38 as a product of the differing analyses.39
Because of the lower burden of proof required in IPR for a patent
to be held invalid, PTAB judges have shown a pattern of
invalidation of patents at a substantially high rate, giving PTAB
judges the nickname “patent death squads.”40 “The PTAB has
invalidated at least ‘one claim’ –or part—in almost 80% of the
patents it has ruled on,” after the implementation of the AIA.41
This seemingly anti-patent bias sparked discussion of the
potential effect of the PTAB invalidations stifling innovation and
creating a barrier to obtaining and maintaining legitimate
patents.42 PTAB practice was further criticized after entities
began to abuse the system for financial gain.43
The structure of IPR coupled with the relentless
invalidation of patent claims by PTAB judges created a system
that could be exploited by those with capital. Kyle Bass, a hedgefund manager, is one of the well-known exploiters of the
system.44 Mr. Bass has challenged the validity of several
pharmaceutical patents using his Coalition for Affordable
Drugs, with the intention that they would be invalidated by the
PTAB.45 Entities like Mr. Bass’s Coalition then see a profit by
betting against the pharmaceutical company’s stock value, and
if they are successful in contesting the patent’s validity, the
company can see a value decline of up to ten percent in its
shares.46 Mr. Bass claims that his actions help to reduce
artificial inflation of drug prices by challenging the patents, but
WL 1940194 (P.T.A.B. May 13, 2014); Kyocera Corp. Motorola Mobility LLC v.
Softview LLC, No. IPR2013-00004, 2014 WL 1382058 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2014).
38. Oyloe et al., supra note 35; see, e.g., Rackspace Hosting, Inc. v.
Rotatable Techs., No. IPR2013-00248, 2013 WL 8595952 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1,
2013); Vibrant Media, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. IPR2013-00170 (JYC), 2013
WL 8595515 (P.T.A.B. July 29, 2013).
39. Oyloe et al., supra note 35.
40. Peter J. Pitts, ‘Patent Death Squads’ vs. Innovation, WALL ST. J. (June
10, 2015, 7:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/patent-death-squads-vsinnovation-1433978591.
41. Id. (citing Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An
Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 101 (2014)).
42. See Pitts, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, Kyle Bass Takes Aim at Drug
Patents, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2015, at B1.
46. Id.; Pitts, supra note 40.
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many believe his goal is a selfish one and that he is taking
advantage of the patent system for his own financial gain.47
Evidence supporting the latter is the fact that Mr. Bass had
teamed up with a known non-practicing entity, Erich
Spangenberg, who has a history of exploiting the patent system
for financial gain.48 Non-practicing entities are a thorn in the
side of legitimate business, and have created issues that are
driving the need for patent reform.
Non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) are individuals or
companies who acquire patent rights from an inventor or owner
of a patent.49 NPEs are also referred to as patent assertion
entities (“PAE”) and pejoratively as patent trolls.50 NPEs do not
produce the patented invention, rather, they make a profit by
aggressively asserting their patent rights over others with newly
obtained patents. Viewed in a positive light, NPEs allow small
and medium sized patent holders to make a profit by
relinquishing some or all of their rights to their patented
invention in exchange for an opportunity to enforce their patents
over potential infringers vicariously through the NPEs.51
However, these functions may be secondary to their personal
financial gain, for the money obtained in settlement of the suits
by the NPEs is not returned to the inventors, rather, it is shared
only with the NPE’s attorney as contingency fees.52
NPEs have been under much scrutiny for alleged abuses of
the patent system and for acting contrary to the fundamental
policies of patent rights. NPEs do not produce any products
47. Walker, supra note 36.
48. Id.
49. David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of NonPracticing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 425-26 (2014)
(stating that non-practicing entities are often referred to as “patent trolls” or
“patent assertion entities”).
50. Bʀɪᴀɴ T. Yᴇʜ & Eᴍɪʟʏ M. Lᴀɴᴢᴀ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
PATENT LITIGATION REFORM LEGISLATION IN THE 114TH CONGRESS 5 (2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43979.pdf. The name patent troll is derived
from the villains of folklore which would sit surreptitiously under a bridge that
they did not build and demand tolls from travelers attempting to cross. Id. The
comparison is derived from the fact that NPEs did not invent or produce the
patented product but still demand monetary compensation for others to use it.
Id.
51. Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 49, at 428.
52. Id. at 429.
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themselves, rather, they make their profits through aggressively
asserting their patent rights.53 This is frequently done in an
unreasonably broad manner to coerce often innocent, alleged
infringers to license under the NPE’s patent or to force a court
settlement in which the NPE’s profit.54 They take advantage of
the broad claim construction of their patents to cast a wide net
over an industry and pull into court anything they claim falls
Federal lawsuits are enormously
under their patent.55
expensive, and by threatening suit against valid producers, they
often force licensing or payment of fees that are substantially
less than the cost of litigation.56 As the Chairman and President
of the Licensing Executives Society, Brian O’Shaughnessy
stated, “[t]he whole point of the system is to encourage
invention, but if it’s impossible to enforce your rights without
going bankrupt, that’s not much encouragement[.]”57 How can
NPE practice be said to promote the progress of science and
useful arts when they do not produce any scientific or useful
product, yet they hoard the patents which claim the rights to
those products and syphon money from entities which are
promoting innovation?
II. The Judicial Branch: NPEs in Court
In 2012, it was estimated that up to sixty-one percent of new
patent lawsuits were brought by NPEs (also known as PAEs)
and the potential cost of these suits was approximated at
53. Shwartz & Kesan, supra note 49, at 429.
54. See BRIAN T. YEH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AN OVERVIEW
OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 5 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R42668.pdf.
55. Id. at Summary.
56. YEH & LANZA, supra note 50, at 5. NPEs extort the producers by
threatening litigation; additionally, they utilize the International Trade
Commission to threaten to block importation to extort a greater value from the
potential defendant. Kurt Orzeck, Reps. Reintroduce Bill to Keep Patent Trolls
Out of ITC, LAW360 (Mar. 23, 2016, 6:23 PM), http://www.law360.com
/articles/775112/reps-reintroduce-bill-to-keep-patent-trolls-out-of-itc.
A
potential remedy is being sought through the proposed Trade Protection, Not
Troll Protection Act. See H.R. 4829, 114th Cong. (2016).
57. Erin Coe, Patent Owners Face Tougher Playing Field as Obama Exits,
LAW360 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/873350/patentowners-face-tougher-playing-field-as-obama-exits.
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twenty-nine billion dollars in 2011.58 Of these lawsuits, it was
shown through a random sample of patent cases, that 325 cases
settled with the majority of NPE suits never reaching trial or
summary judgment.59 According to another study, NPEs engage
in considerably more lawsuits than their product-producing
counterparts, but also have a substantially lower chance of
winning if the case proceeds to trial.60 This accounts for the
extraordinarily high settlement rate of NPEs at 89.6% of cases.61
NPEs rely on these suits to profit, so they must be diligent in
choosing which entities to pursue in court, for if the party
asserted against has the means to see the case to the end, they
have a higher chance of winning. With NPEs maintaining their
presence in the years following the implementation of the
America Invents Act,62 the courts have produced a handful of
influential decisions limiting the abuse of NPEs.
A significant limitation was placed on NPEs in the Supreme
Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, which vastly
limited the ability of patent trolls to receive injunctive relief.63
The case involved a “business method patent” owned by
MercExchange “designed to facilitate the sale of goods by
establishing a central authority to promote trust among
participants.”64 The court outlined a four-factor test for the
appropriateness of injunctive relief, addressing (1) irreparable
58. Colleen Chien, Patent Assertion Entities, SANTA CLARA U. slide 23
(Dec. 10, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314;
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 389 (2014).
59. Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 375-77,
385 (2012) (stating that the cases sampled were from 2007 to 2011 and showed
an increase in NPE lawsuits from 22% to 40% over the time period).
60. John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat
Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 692-94 (2011) (stating NPEs win judgments
on the merits in 9.2% of cases compared to 50% for product producing wins).
61. Id. at 694.
62. While there may have been a decrease in lawsuits brought by NPEs
in 2011, in 2013, after the implementation of the America Invents Act, NPEs
still accounted for an estimated 52% of all patent infringement suits. James
Bessen, Patent Trolling was Up 11 Percent Last Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 31,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/31/patent
-trolling-was-up-11-percent-last-year/.
63. See generally 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
64. Id. at 390.
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injury; (2) inadequacy of other remedies; (3) balancing of the
hardships of both parties; and (4) the public interest.65 While
the Supreme Court stated that NPEs are not disqualified from
injunctive relief per se, courts have since consistently weighed
the factors against NPEs for injunctive relief.66 Furthermore,
following the decision in eBay, NPEs have had a rather difficult
time demonstrating “irreparable” harm when they have no
intentions of producing their patented subject matter.67 By
effectively removing the ability of NPEs to obtain injunctive
relief, eBay has limited their awards to monetary damages, and
has prevented NPEs from completely shutting down the
operations of producers in court.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Breyer in 2015,
the Supreme Court in Cuozzo empowered the USPTO and
validated its regulation of its agency proceedings.68 The case
involved a patent for a speedometer that showed the driver when
they were driving in excess of the speed limit.69 The plaintiffs
were a group of NPEs who sought to alter the procedure of inter
partes review by invalidating the broadest reasonable
construction standard in favor of a standard more favorable to
the patent holders.70 This was an attempt to establish an
appealable standard which would give a presumption of validity
to a plaintiff’s patent in IPR, hence creating an analogous
standard to the one used in district court.71 The NPEs argued
65. Id. at 391.
66. Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation
After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1987-90 (2016)
(demonstrating that NPEs were only 16% successful in obtaining an injunction
following a finding of liability, while other patentees were 80% successful in
obtaining injunctions); see, e.g., Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); Lamina Packing Innovations, LLC v. Monsieur Touton Selection,
Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 5039(CM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51020 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4,
2013); Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Comput. Inc., No. 06-cv-462-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38220 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2010).
67. See Seaman, supra note 66, at 1952-53.
68. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
69. Id. at 2138.
70. Joe Mullin, Supreme Court sends off patent troll that challenged
review rules with an 8-0 slapdown, ARSTECHNICA (June 23, 2016),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/06/how-a-patent-troll-brought-itscolor-shifting-speedometer-to-the-supreme-court/.
71. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 136 S. Ct. at 2134-35.
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that the agency lacked authority to use its own standard of
review.72 In his decision, Justice Breyer analogized IPR with a
“specialized agency proceeding” rather than a judicial decision.73
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the USPTO has the
authority under case law (Chevron and Mead) to regulate its own
proceedings and fill in any gaps or ambiguities in the
Congressional statutes.74 The upholding of the USPTO’s
broadest reasonable interpretation standard has allowed the
agency to be critical of overly broad patents, and has aided in the
identification, management, and invalidation of such patents
that NPEs collect and enforce.
A persistent judicial exploitation that NPEs often utilized
was a method of forum shopping. Given the legal freedom to do
so, an asserting party would often choose to bring its case in a
district that is known for its patent-owner-friendly decisions.75
Although there are specific statutes governing venue in patent
cases, in 1990 the Federal Circuit expanded the scope of venue
in VE Holding Corp. to “any district where there would be
personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant at the time
the action is commenced.”76
This decision led to valid
determinations of jurisdiction in any state which the patented
product or allegedly infringing product was sold. Because of
this, historically, the Eastern District of Texas received “20-25%
of all patent litigation.”77 The Supreme Court recently decided
a case which involved this very type of venue shopping.
72. Id. at 2142.
73. Id. at 2135.
74. Id. at 2144 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229
(2001); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)).
75. Gene Quinn, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Patent Venue Case Filled
with Patent Reform Implications, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/14/supreme-court-patent-venue-casepatent-reform-implications/id=75751/; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(c)(2), 1400(b)
(2012). The statutes regarding proper venue are 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which
states that a “patent infringement [action] may be brought in the judicial
district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed
acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business[,]” and
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), which states that a corporation is a resident of a district
“in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction . . . .”
76. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1990). For the applicable statutes, see supra note 90.
77. Quinn, supra note 74.
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The recent TC Heartland v. Kraft has the potential to reduce
the instances of venue shopping in patent infringement cases.78
The patent infringement suit was brought by Kraft over its Mio
water enhancers, and Kraft advocated for the case to be heard
in Delaware, a patent-friendly venue.79 The fundamental
question to be determined in the case was the meaning of the
term “residence” as applied to corporate entities asserting
patent rights in jurisdictions outside of their state of
incorporation.80 The Supreme Court held that “[a]s applied to
domestic corporations, ‘reside[nce]’ in § 1400(b) refers only to the
State of Incorporation.”81 Going forward, in the context of NPEs
that are not incorporated in the forum state, venue contests will
now turn upon the satisfaction of a “regular and established
place of business” under § 1400(b),82 which is a more
comprehensive test.83
One of the most significant patent cases to be tried before
the Supreme Court since the implementation of the AIA was
Alice v. CLS Bank.84 In Alice, the Court addressed patentable
subject matter restrictions under 35 U.S.C. § 101.85 While
abstract ideas, such as mathematical equations, remain outside
of the realm of patentable subject matter, some entities were
acquiring broad and vague patents on such ideas by claiming the
idea through the use of a computer. The patents at issue in Alice
claimed “(1) a method for exchanging financial obligations, (2) a
computer system configured to carry out the method for
exchanging obligations, and (3) a computer-readable medium
containing program code for performing the method of

78. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514
(2017).
79. See id. at 1517.
80. Id. at 1516-17.
81. Id. at 1521.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).
83. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2017). (the
Federal Circuit has established a three-part test for an entity to satisfy a
regular and established place of business within the forum under §1400(b): the
entity must have (1) a physical presence in the forum (2) that is regular and
established (not sporadic), and (3) is the place of the business and not solely
the place of an employee).
84. See generally 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
85. Id. at 2352; see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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exchanging obligations.”86 In deciding the case, the Court relied
heavily on Mayo, which provides the framework for the section
101 claims at issue.87 The case resulted in the invalidation of
the abstract subject matter patents, referred to as business
method patents, and began a trend of invalidation of such
patents in the USPTO.88 Such patents were very valuable to
NPEs because of their ability to enforce their patents against a
wide range of potential infringers due to their broad reach and
commonly utilized subject matter. Although Alice may have
created just as much confusion as clarification over the
boundaries of patentable subject matter in the software
industry, it functioned to halt attempts of enforcement by NPEs
holding business method patents and render them invalid in
USPTO proceedings.
A recent decision by Judge Cote in the Southern District of
New York ordered an unusual remedy in a patent infringement
suit involving NPEs with business method patents.89 The case
involved AlphaCap Ventures, an NPE, suing ten companies over
infringement of its business method patent over financing data
collection.90 The NPE, unsurprisingly, sued each entity in the
Eastern District of Texas, and each party settled except Gust,
who transferred the case to New York and raised its own claims
of abuse of process and patent misuse against AlphaCap.91 In
her strongly-worded decision, Judge Cote stated that the NPEs
were aware of the invalidation of their patents by the Alice
decision, yet commenced the suits anyway.92 She stated that the
commencement of the suit, knowing the patents were
86. Id. at 2349.
87. Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78-80 (2012)). When addressing the patentability of claims
that involve laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas the court
must: (1) determine whether the claims involve one of these concepts; (2)
determine if there are additional elements that transform the claim into a
patentable combination. Id.
88. Nam Kim, Software and Business Method Inventions After Alice,
INTELL. PROP. L. BLOG (Sep. 23, 2016), https://www.intellectualpropertylaw
blog.com/archives/software-and-business-method-inventions-after-alice.
89. See Gust, Inc. v. AlphaCap Ventures, LLC, No. 15cv6192 (DLC), 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98869 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2016).
90. Id. at *1-2.
91. Id. at *3-5.
92. Id. at *4.
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invalidated, was frivolous and awarded over $500,000 in
attorney’s fees against the NPE.93 The decision became unusual
when the Judge ordered the NPE as well as its counsel, Gutride
Safier LLP to pay the fees for the frivolous suit.94 The decision
to make the attorneys for the NPE responsible for the payment
of the fees sets up an interesting situation for future NPEs like
AlphaCap. If attorneys can be personally held to pay the
opposing counsel’s fees for bringing a lawsuit asserting an
overly-broad patent, they may very well be dissuaded from
representing NPEs at all. This decision, if adhered to, may have
the future effect of forcing NPEs to choose their lawsuits much
more carefully in order to secure counsel for the matter. While
federal courts have strategically limited the abuses of NPEs, the
legislative branch has been developing reform that would
constitute much more broad and immediate changes to the
patent system.
III. The Legislative Branch: Proposed Reform
A recent change to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”) dealt a blow to the non-practicing entities’ legal
arsenal. In December of 2015, the FRCP was amended and Rule
84 was abrogated.95 Rule 84 provided an abbreviated complaint
template, Form 18, which exempted patent infringement
complaints from the standards set in Twombly and Iqbal.96
Prior to the amendment, patent infringement complaints only
needed to provide basic factual allegations, while the standard
outside of Rule 84 was plausibility.97 This allowed NPEs to
assert a valid claim without any substantial factual allegations,
making their threats of suit even more likely. It is argued that
93. Ryan Davis, NPE, Gutride Safier Ordered to Pay Up in ‘Frivolous’
Suit, LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2016, 10:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
874955/npe-gutride-safier-ordered-to-pay-up-in-frivolous-suit.
94. Id.
95. Fᴇᴅ. R. Cɪᴠ. P. 84.
96. Dennis Crouch, An Early Review of the Impact of Form 18’s
Elimination on Pleading Direct Infringement, PATENTLYO (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://patentlyo. com/patent/2016/04/elimination-pleading-infringement.html.
See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
97. Id.
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the limited requirements encouraged NPEs to “intitiate
frivolous lawsuits” whose pleadings would not meet the general
standard.98 Additionally, the lack of information supplied in the
initial pleadings would result in lengthier discovery and slow
and costly lawsuits.99 The amendments were too recent to
provide any substantial evidence of their effect on NPEs, but
courts have already begun to require stricter standards on
patent infringement complaints.100 In addition to requiring
stricter standards for pleadings, there are several proposed bills
in Congress that would have a substantial impact on the abuses
of NPEs in the patent system.
One of the most expansive proposed patent reform bills was
the Innovation Act. The Innovation Act was introduced by
Representative Goodlatte in February, 2015.101 The first
ambition of the act was to clarify the level of detail required in
the pleadings of an infringement suit, relating to the lower
acceptable standard prior to the abrogation of the Form 18
pleadings.102 The bill would require the complaint to allege in
detail the patented invention allegedly infringed upon, the
elements of the specific claims infringed, the specific acts of the
infringer along with a detailed description of the infringing
instrumentality, and the authority of the party to assert the
action against Defendant.103 Additionally, the complaint must
identify all entities that have a financial interest and any parent
company and licensee of the plaintiff, which ties into the second
objective of the bill.104
98. YEH & LANZA, supra note 50, at 8.
99. H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 22-23 (2013).
100. See, e.g., InCom Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., No. CV15-3011, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 71319, at *2-4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016); Raindance Techs., Inc. v.
10x Genomics, Inc., No. 15-152-RGA, 2016 US. Dist. LEXIS 33875, *6-7 (D.
Del. Mar. 4, 2016).
101. Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015).
102. Id. § 3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (abrogated, effective3 Dec. 1, 2015).
103. Id. The Senate proposed Protecting American Talent and
Entrepreneurship Act, (PATENT Act), which outlines very similar
requirements for pleadings in infringement lawsuits. A clear difference
between the bills is that the PATENT Act does not require the description of
the authority to bring suit within the pleading, but requires specific
information to be disclosed within fourteen days after service or filing. S.1137,
114th Cong. § 281B(b) (2015).
104. H.R. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 114-235, at 5 (2015).
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The second purpose of the Act was to allow for the joinder of
parties with an interest in the suit.105 The bill allowed for a
party other than the party alleging infringement to be joined
when that party:
(A) is an assignee of the patent or patents at issue;
(B) has a right, including a contingent right, to
enforce or sublicense the patent or patents at
issue; or
(C) has a direct financial interest in the patent or
patents at issue, including the right to any part of
an award of damages or any part of licensing
revenue . . . .106
The significance of this proposition is to create transparency
as to which entities have a financial interest in the lawsuit, and
which larger entities may be the controlling party over the
ownership of the patent rights. NPEs have, in the past, set up
elaborate chains of shell companies making it difficult to legally
reach the ultimate entity in charge (the entity with the capital).
If an NPE shell company loses a suit, they may just file for
bankruptcy for they do not have the capital to pay the fees and
the deep pocketed parent company is not a party within the suit.
This provision works to require that parent company to be
disclosed and mandates them to participate in the suit.
The third objective of the Act was to limit the cost of
discovery and to allocate the costs of litigation effectively. This
was accomplished by the Act postponing discovery during the
resolution of pre-trial motions.107 With several exceptions, the
Act would generally stay discovery pending a motion to sever a
claim or for misjoinder, a transfer of venue, or a motion to
dismiss.108 The exceptions include when the court believes
discovery is necessary to decide a motion, issues involving
preliminary injunctions, parties’ consent to discovery, and
105. Id. at 3-4.
106. Id. at 4.
107. YEH & LANZA, supra note 50, at 9.
108. Id. at 9-10. The PATENT Act allows for limited discovery to resolve
pre-trial motions, but overall, calls for similar reform as the Innovation Act.
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certain drug product disputes.109 This provision of the Act was
designed to limit the cost to the parties in litigation by
eliminating the cost of discovery during the interim of motion
decisions. This provision had the potential to work significantly
against NPEs in lowering the cost of litigation to the infringing
party and possibly work in favor of avoiding settlement with the
entity. At the very least, NPEs would have to reevaluate their
demands for settlement; when NPEs present an offer of
settlement they must demand an amount significantly lower
than the cost of litigation in order to be successful in pressuring
the defendant to settle. If similar reform is successful in
lowering the cost of litigation, it may have the secondary effect
of lowering the demands of NPEs.
Section 3 of the Act also proposed shifting the costs of patent
litigation.110 The Act proposed that the non-prevailing party of
the patent infringement suit would be liable for reasonable
attorney’s fees.111 Since the vast majority of NPE suits that do
not end in settlement are resolved in favor of the allegedly
infringing party, this could provide substantial reform in
opposition of NPEs. This provision increased the risk for NPEs
to bring a lawsuit and would result in decisions similar to that
of Judge Cote in AlphaCap Ventures, discussed above.112
Additionally, in a provision titled “covenant not to sue,” the Act
called for attorney’s fees for unilateral motions to dismiss.113
Working in conjunction with the increased pleading
requirements, a complaint alleging infringement by an NPE
that is overreaching or unreasonably vague may be dismissed
along with the requirement of payment of attorney’s fees. This
increased risk of dismissal could also dissuade NPEs from
casting a wide net and aggressively asserting their patent rights
with broad patent claims at the risk of being dismissed.
Moreover, if the party cannot pay, a joined party may be
109. Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015).
110. Id.
111. Id. (the act outlines an exception to the fees if the non-prevailing
party’s position and conduct are reasonably justified in law and fact, or for
special circumstances). The Senate’s PATENT Act also calls for the payment
of attorney’s fees if the position or conduct of the asserting party is not
objectively reasonable. S.1137, 114th Cong. § 7 (2015).
112. See supra Section II.
113. Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015).
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responsible for the remainder of the fees.114 Building off of the
necessary joinder provision of the Act, the organization that is
ultimately leading these patent enforcers will be held liable for
whatever damages that its cronies cannot pay.
The fourth purpose of the Act required the USPTO to
provide small businesses with information regarding abusive
patent litigation practices.115 Section 7 of the Innovation Act
addressed small business education and outreach.116 The
section would require the USPTO to pursue two initiatives. The
first requirement was that the director of the USPTO “shall
develop educational resources for small businesses to address
concerns arising from patent infringement.”117 The second
provision would require “education and awareness [to small
businesses] on abusive patent litigation practices” and would
require a dedicated section of the official USPTO website to
small business education.118 These resources would spread
awareness of patent troll practice and help prevent NPEs from
preying on small uninformed businesses.
Receiving an
unanticipated demand letter from an unknown company
threatening suit in the absence of a licenses agreement may send
a small business into panic. Without capital to defend a suit
against a seemingly wealthy, successful, patent-owning
company, a small business may concede immediately to the
demands without realizing it may have done nothing wrong.
These programs may have the effect of significantly reducing
easy targets from the pool of potential NPE victims.
The Innovation Act also addressed the issue of venue
shopping discussed in TC Heartland. The proposed provision
under the Act would permit jurisdiction in a judicial district
“where the defendant has a principal place of business or is
114. Id.
115. Id. § 7.
116. Id. Additionally, the proposed PATENT Act also contains a provision
requiring educational resources to be made available to small businesses. See
S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 13 (2015).
117. H.R. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 114-235, § 7(a)(1), at 12 (2015).
118. Id. §§ 7(a)(2), 7(b)(1). Like the Innovation Act and PATENT Act, the
STRONG Patents Act address the issue of abusive patent practice on small
businesses. The STRONG Patents Act would “require the Small Business
Administration to produce a report that analyzes the impact of patent
ownership by small businesses . . . .” YEH & LANZA, supra note 50, at 36.
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incorporated[,]” the defendant has infringed and “has a regular
and established physical facility[,]” the defendant consents to
jurisdiction, the inventor conducted research, or where a party
has a psychical facility for a purpose other than creating venue
in that jurisdiction.119 This provision was, of course, drafted
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland; however,
the provision had the potential to significantly reduce the ability
of plaintiffs to travel nationwide to bring an infringement suit in
a district that is likely to give a favorable decision. Following
the TC Heartland decision, venue may no longer be a focus of
patent reform, but time will tell if further legislative action
should be taken in reducing a patent plaintiff’s ability to forum
shop. Likewise, there may be increased manufacturing and
research and development coming to the Eastern District of
Texas in order for businesses to take full advantage of the most
patent-friendly forum.
The fifth objective of the Act was to end the practice of bad
faith demand letters. Demand letters are sent by the patent
holding party and typically contain a cease and desist demand
or a demand that the allegedly infringing party establish a
license with the patent holder for its product.120 NPEs are often
associated with the use of vague demand letters “for the sole
purpose of extracting financial concessions.”121 The act stated
that “[i]t is the sense of Congress that it is an abuse of the patent
system and against public policy for a party to send out
purposefully evasive demand letters to end users alleging patent
infringement.”122 The bill further stated that demand letters
must contain “basic information about the patent in question,
what is being infringed, and how it is being infringed.”123 This
provides the accused party with adequate information as to the
legitimacy of the claims and allows the entity to better prepare
a litigation strategy if they were to choose to defend themselves
over succumbing to the demands of the NPE.
There were three additional proposed patent reform bills
which addressed the issue of abusive demand letters by NPEs.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9

Id.; Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015).
YEH & LANZA, supra note 50 at 23.
Id. at 27.
H.R. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 114-235, § 281B(e), at 6 (2015).
Id.
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First, the Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015 addressed
necessary change to the content of demand letters.124 The bill
would require significant disclosure from the asserting entity of
patent rights and ownership as well as information on the
recipients and the history of patent assertion for entities sending
more than twenty demand letters within a one-year period.125
Additionally, the bill contained eighteen informational
requirements that each demand letter must contain. These
requirements included, but were not limited to, disclosure of
information on the infringed patent, identification of claims
infringed, detailed explanation of how the product infringes the
patent, and information regarding the right of the asserting
party to bring the patent infringement claim.126 The objective of
this bill was to eliminate the practice of abusive demand letters
and to seize one of the legal weapons in the NPE arsenal, which
is used to coerce allegedly infringing parties into submitting to
the NPE’s demands.
The remaining two proposed bills on demand letter reform
were the Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (“TROL”) Act127
and the Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s
Growth (“STRONG”) Patents Act.128 These two bills were
identical in that they identified abusive demand letter practice
as a violation of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act and
authorized the FTC to enforce regulation against unfair or
deceptive demand letters.129 The separate bills outlined several
instances in which demand letters may be classified as unfair or
deceptive acts or practices: (1) if a sender of a demand letter acts
in bad faith regarding the identity of parties or presence of
current civil action;130 (2) seeks compensation, in bad faith,

124. See Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 1896, 114th
Cong. (2015).
125. Id. § 2.
126. Id. § 3.
127. H.R. 2045, 114th Cong. (2015) (TROL is a clever name that plays off
of a name commonly given to NPEs, patent trolls, and stands for Targeting
Rogue and Opaque Letters).
128. S. 632, 114th Cong. (2015) (STRONG stands for Support Technology
and Research for Our Nation’s Growth).
129. See H.R. 2045, § 2(a), at 3-6; S. 632, § 202(a).
130. H.R. 2045, § 2(a)(1); S. 632, §202(a)(1).
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under an invalid patent,131 or; (3) in bad faith, fails to include
any of the following information; the identification of asserting
entities and patent(s) infringed, identification of the infringed
product, a description of how the product infringes, or the
contact information for patent holder.132 While the individual
bills may have differed, they both addressed the need for the
disclosure of information within the letters of the identity of
asserting parties, identity of any patents infringed, and,
specifically, how the patent has been infringed.
These
fundamental pieces of information allow the alleged infringer to
seek legal counsel and begin discussing the merits of the
accusations. Without such information, and in the current state
of patent demand letters, the party may be left with insufficient
information to prepare for litigation and may be confronted by a
threat which has been made in bad faith to extort a license
agreement from the party.
As discussed earlier, a fundamental difference between
district court patent proceedings and USPTO patent contests is
the burden of proof required for a showing of invalidity.133 The
USPTO currently requires the preponderance of the evidence
standard while the district court requires clear and convincing
evidence.134 The issue that this creates, aside from general
inconsistency, is a presumption of patent validity in district
court and an emergence of anti-patent “death squads” in the
USPTO.135 While the Innovation Act was silent on the issue, the
Senate’s PATENT Act sought to establish a presumption of
claim validity for IPR and post grant review proceedings, while
maintaining the current standard of preponderance of the
evidence.136 The STRONG Patents Act, however, sought to
amend the standard in the USPTO proceedings to mirror that of
the district court’s standard of proof of clear and convincing
131. H.R. 2045, § 2(a)(2); S. 632, §202(a)(2).
132. H.R. 2045, § 2(a)(3); S. 632, § 202(a)(3).
133. See supra Introduction to The Patent System and Non-Practicing
Entities.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see Pitts, supra note 40.
136. PATENT Act, S.1137, 114th Cong. § 11(b)(3), (1)(J)(2)(E) (2015) (this
objective to create a universal standard of review between federal court and
the USPTO is analogous to the argument that the NPEs asserted in Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016)).
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evidence.137 This had the potential to create uniformity in the
analyses used by the judicial and administrative entities, but
more significantly, has the potential to return the PTAB to a propatent institution. Conversely, as discussed in Cuozzo above,
the importation of the clear and convincing standard to the
USPTO post-grant proceedings could potentially make it more
difficult to invalidate unreasonably broad patents being asserted
by NPEs.
Congress has been considering the next round of patent
reform since the effects of the AIA have become apparent. The
AIA did not sufficiently address the abuses of the patent system
by NPEs, and the results are patently clear. Potential remedies
to some of the largest issues are addressed in the proposed bills
discussed above, but as of the 2016 presidential election, the bills
have failed to make it out of Congress. With the transition of
administrations comes other opportunities for patent reform
from the executive branch of the United States Government.
IV. The Executive Branch: The Future of Reform
The proposed bills discussed above currently remain in the
House and Senate with their destinies uncertain. The Obama
Administration made significant progress in patent reform with
the AIA, but President Obama himself admitted that it “only
went about halfway to where we need to go.”138 With his term
coming to an end, President Obama was referred to as “the most
hands-on policy-savvy president in the IP field that we’ve ever
had[.]”139 With his departure, President Obama has passed on
the responsibility to see the remaining issues resolved.
The 2016 election has created a sweeping change in favor of
the Republican Party, and the proposed patent reform bills have
historically received mixed support by the Republican Party.140
137. S. 632, §§ 102(c), 103(c).
138. The Obama White House, President Obama Participates in a
Fireside Hangout on Google+, YᴏᴜTᴜʙᴇ (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=kp_zigxMS-Y.
139. Coe, supra note 57.
140. See Republican/Conservative, MᴀᴘLɪɢʜᴛ, http://maplight.org/uscongress/interest/J1100/bills (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (demonstrating
Republican representatives both supporting and opposing past patent reform
bills).
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A revived Innovation Act is not likely to make progress in the
115th Congress, but it is likely that Senator Chris Coons will
resubmit the STRONG Act in the coming Congress.141 President
Trump has remained relatively quiet on the issues of patent
reform, with the exception of his desire to increase intellectual
property law enforcement against countries such as China.142
The Trump Administration calls for the implementation of
changes on high-priority controversial issues, such as
immigration bans, wall and pipeline construction, the defeat of
ISIS, and the refocusing of the Environmental Protection
Agency.143 With the Administration’s necessary focus on these
crucial issues, it is likely that patent reform will be, initially, a
low priority for the Trump Administration. However, the patent
landscape is influenced by more than reform bills alone.
The most significant influence that President Trump will
have on the patent system, in the absence of priority of reform,
is his appointments. The prior Director of the USPTO, Michelle
Lee was replaced by President Trump during the introduction of
his Administration with Andrei Iancu.144 The director “sets the
tone for hiring and promoting administrative judges, examiners,
and supervisors” which influences the agency’s position and
enforcement of patent rights.145 Many had speculated as to who
President Trump’s nomination would be for the position.
Predictions included Michelle Lee staying as the current
director, Phil Johnson of Johnson & Johnson, or an individual
from the pharmaceutical industry, but President Trump had not
expressed an interest in any particular candidate until August
141. Russell Binns, Patents Under the Trump Administration, LAW360
(Jan. 27, 2017, 3:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/885572/patentsunder-the-trump-administration.
142. Id.
143. Miriam Valverde, What Trump has done in his first 100 days in
office, POLITIFACT (April 16, 2017), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2017/apr/26/what-trump-has-done-his-first-100-days-office/.
144. Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Andrei
Iancu Begins Role as New Director of United States Patent and Trademark
Office (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/andreiiancu-begins-role-new-director-united-states-patent-and-trademark.
145. Steve Hall & Kate Van Namen, The Impact of President Trump’s IPRelated Appointments, FINDING IP VALUE (Jan. 26, 2017), https://finding
ipvalue.com/2017/01/26/the-impact-of-president-trumps-ip-relatedappointments/.
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of 2017.146
Arguably, the most influential appointment comes from
President Trump’s Supreme Court appointment. President
Trump’s nominee, and newest Supreme Court Justice, Neil
Gorsuch, filled the vacant position left by the late Antonin
Scalia.147 Gorsuch has not had a decision that enlightens us on
his stance of the state of the patent system, but he has expressed
his desire to do-away with Chevron deference.148 Chevron was a
Supreme Court decision that established a blueprint for
reviewing courts to give administrative agencies deference on
particular matters of agency expertise.149 In the absence of
Chevron, a reviewing court would review a claim de novo, and
would strip away some of the USPTO’s authority given to it in
the Cuozzo decision.150
Removal of Chevron deference would put parties being
subjected to lawsuits by NPEs at an even greater disadvantage.
A company defending against an infringement claim by an NPE
would bring an IPR proceeding to try and reduce the costs of
litigation, and it would have the benefit of the preponderance of
the evidence test favoring invalidation of a weak patents. Then,
when the NPE’s weak patent is invalidated, it could simply
appeal to Federal Court, which would no longer have to give any
deference to the USPTO, nor would it apply the same legal
standard; rather, the court would apply the clear and convincing
evidence test, which would favor the validation of the patent,
and would essentially undo the expert decision of the PTAB.

146. Binns, supra note 125; Gene Quinn, Trump Nominates Andrei Iancu
to be USPTO Director, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 26, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.
com/2017/08/26/trump-nominates-andrei-iancu-uspto-director/id=87362/.
147. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Neil Gorsuch is Sworn In as Supreme Court
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/us/
politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html.
148. Scott Graham, What to Expect From Neil Gorsuch on IP, Patents and
Trade Secrets, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 13, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://www.nationallaw
journal.com/id=1202779049527/What-to-Expect-From-Neil-Gorsuch-on-IPPatents-and-Trade-Secrets?slreturn=20170123154805.
149. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 468
U.S. 837 (1984).
150. Lawrence Ashery, The State of Judicial Deference to the USPTO,
LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2016, 12:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/859781/
the-state-of-judicial-deference-to-the-uspto.
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With Supreme Court patent cases being so influential over
the past several years, Neil Gorsuch may have a significant
impact on the future of patent law. The impact is amplified by
the possibility of additional Supreme Court appointments
during Trump’s presidency. While the outcome of future
Supreme Court patent decisions are uncertain, what is certain
is the need for reform in the patent system, the need for the
promotion of fairness, the need to adhere to the principles of the
Constitution, and the need for a shield against legitimate
businesses of all sizes against the predators of the patent field.
V. Conclusion
The patent system was implemented to promote scientific
and technological advancements and provide inventors with a
form of protection over their work. The protections were so
fundamental that they appear in Article I of the Constitution.
The accumulation of patent rights by non-practicing entities is
contrary to these principals. NPEs abuse the legal system by
exercising blatant forum shopping, sending abusive and vague
demand letters, enforcing patents with subject matter that is on
the fringe of patentability, forcing licensing agreements and
settlement payments from companies that produce products in
good faith, hiding behind shell corporations to avoid liability,
and costing innocent companies millions of dollars in legal fees
to succeed in litigation. There is potential to eliminate these
practices through upcoming Supreme Court decisions, proposed
legislation in Congress, and new presidential appointments that
will influence the future of patent reform. Regardless of the
governmental avenue, reform is justified for the sake of
innovation and for the sake of upholding the principles found
within the United States Constitution.
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